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There is yet another misconception for which, although the author lends it his countenance, he cannot fairly be held responsible, and which we might for that reason be inclined now to pass over, were it not so constantly reiterated. We refer to the supposition that international arbitration has "failed" because it has represented, in theory and in practice, the idea of "compromise" rather than that of "judicial" decision. The present prevalence of this supposition is no doubt chiefly to be ascribed to the activities of certain societies, exhibiting a certain unity of direction and control, which have industriously disseminated the impression, not indeed with malice, but without examination of the facts. The impression involves two assumptions, (1) that "compromise" has not formed an important element in "judicial" judgments, and (2) that it has, on the contrary, distinctively characterized the proceedings of international tribunals of arbitration. Both these assumptions are hasty, superficial, and inaccurate. So far as concerns international arbitrations, it has fallen to the lot of the reviewer to become familiar with the proceedings of substantially all of them, ancient and modern, so far as they can now be known; and he does not hesitate to affirm, upon the strength of this somewhat exact knowledge of the subject, that the assertions so constantly made during the past few years, as to the "non-judicial" or "unjudicial" character of arbitral proceedings, are due to unverified preconceptions and are essentially misleading.

J. B. MOORE.

The People's Part in Peace. By ORDWAY TEAD. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1918.—ix, 156 pp.

It was said of a well-known writer on international law, in the middle of the last century, that he presented all views and all contentions with "laborious impartiality." This cannot be said of the vast number of volumes now appearing on peace and the organization of the world so as to secure it. Many authors have specifics; others have none, but profess to deal with the entire problem; while yet others discuss particular phases of it. Mr. Tead assures us that "the plain people of the world want peace," but "not peace at any price." This condition is not wholly new. He does not, however, undertake to estimate all the elements of "price," but endeavors to answer the question how "practical effect" can be given to the peace terms and the conditions contained in the Inter-Allied Labor War Aims which were published in a supplement to the *New Republic* of

March 23, 1918, and which he declares to be "in complete harmony with President Wilson's fourteen-point speech."

It may be unnecessary to raise a question as to what effect recent elections, particularly in Great Britain, may have had on the position, international as well as national, of the declaration of the Inter-Allied Labor War Aims in the negotiations soon to take place in France. Mr. Tead's discussion is not wholly concerned with that declaration; and, although he professes to treat "only" of the economic phases of international reorganization, he discusses at some length the question of a league of nations, the economic guarantees of peace, international labor legislation, the basis of representation in "international government," national economy, and "the spiritual guarantees of peace." He recognizes the truth that, while the struggle for existence is an all-pervasive influence, ideas not essentially economic enter into the problem of peace and war. Among these he specifies the exaltation of force, in the conception that might makes right; the doctrine that the state is supreme and is a thing in itself; that the state exists as an agent for the creation of national profits; that trade exists primarily for the private traders, and that certain races are inferior and unable to govern themselves, either immediately or ultimately. He believes that, while these ideas have "wide currency" in Germany, they are maintained elsewhere by a sufficient minority to make it worth while to understand the dangers which their acceptance entails. He believes it to be necessary to distinguish more carefully than is usual the difference between incapacity for self-government and an immaturity in national development due to historic forces, especially as a lack of national cohesion may be found to prevail in parts of the world that properly resent the imputation of inferiority. He thinks that "the new world, the world of the next generation, is unmistakably destined to swing about a new center—the human individual," and that to spiritualize the purposes of life is the "paramount task of reconstruction." For old methods he would substitute "social control" for "social ends"; and he declares that "social control depends upon the enthroning of a new principle in individuals and in nations—the principle of the value of people as supreme over profits and property, over secret treaties and States."

We hope that the author's generous views may find wide acceptance. So far as concerns "secret treaties," it may be remarked that, with the exception now and then of a stealthy agreement for the division of territory, the treaties by which "profits and property"

have been exalted have usually been of a flagrantly open character. Treaties relating to trade and tariffs are the ones whose approval by legislative chambers has in modern times most generally been exacted. We would not discourage anyone's hopes or aspirations; but it is idle to shrink from the conclusion that the regeneration of the world will continue to depend less upon the enunciation of benevolent principles than upon the precise, practical application of them.

J. B. MOORE.

The Ethics of Co-operation. By JAMES H. TUFTS. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918.—73 pp.

A lecture delivered at the University of California on the Weinstock Foundation now appears in the form of this booklet. The author maintains that the political, economic and religious institutions throughout history appear to be organized under one of the systems characterized as dominance, competition, or co-operation, or some combination of them. Each one of these schemes has given rise to its own particular conception of what in the view of mankind may be regarded as good and reputable.

For the most part, it is urged, the civilized portion of mankind has outgrown the scheme of organization founded on the idea of dominance. The prevailing form of social organization is now competitive. Obviously, however, the competitive system also is out of touch with modern requirements of life in society, since the criterion of success under this system is personal gain and glory. The way out of these difficulties seems to be the organization of society on a co-operative basis in which the standard of honor and success is the promotion of the common good through the pursuit of a common purpose.

According to the author's interpretation of competition and co-operation there is not a radical distinction between them. Competition guided by the "invisible hand" works for the common good quite as effectively as co-operation (page 34), without, however, the common good being consciously the purpose of the human agent under the competitive system. Co-operation consists in making the common good the deliberate object of individual endeavor. That is to say, what is required to make the transition from a competitive to a co-operative system is not so much a change in the institutional fabric of civilized society as a change of heart (attitude) in the individual. Viewed in this light, the advent of the new era (of co-